Perpetually enveloped in a haze of elusive criteria, hastily drawn conclusions, academic nit-picking and media-inspired sensationalism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) never lacks for its share of controversy. Indeed, clinicians and patients on both sides of the Atlantic have good reason to be bewildered by what must often seem like constantly shifting diagnostic sands. Treatment strategies also fade in and out of professional and public acceptance.
Yet, despite the many well-publicized debates about the management of ADHD, it would be inaccurate to portray this arena as wholly chaotic. After all, clinical researchers can point to a vast body of published work that offers ample information about genetic and family factors, the life history of the disorder, predictors of outcome, and the relative benefits of medical, educational, and parent-oriented treatments1'2. And while no one could fairly claim a monolithic American perspective on ADHD, a rough consensus has emerged within the professional community about some of the central issues associated with clinical management.
Rather than review already-published diagnostic criteria, rehash oft-described symptom clusters, or develop an argument that the US approach to ADHD is somehow superior, I would instead like to consider some of the essential assumptions that, for most of us, drive the identification and treatment of this disorder. Perhaps by revisiting several of these fundamental principles, it is easier to cut through at least some of the hyperbole and clutter (for a more complete review, see refs 3 and 4).
ASSUMPTION 1: THE CAPACITY TO ATTEND AND EXERT SELF-CONTROL, LIKE ALL HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS, FALLS ALONG A NORMAL

DISTRIBUTION
Because ADHD is construed as a disease entity, we can easily forget that the central characteristics of the disorder are extreme variants of normal human behaviour. The ability to attend and delay is no different from characteristics such as height, weight, IQ, or blood pressure, in that individuals will vary from one another along a normal continuum. For whatever reason, some people find themselves at the lowest end of that distribution and are therefore abnormally limited in the capacity to inhibit their behaviour in circumstances requiring attention, persistence and self-control. Therefore, to claim that there is no such thing as deficits in attention and self-control would be tantamount to an assertion that dwarfism, obesity, retardation, or hypertension are illusory. Also, whether the normal variation of a function is due largely to biological or environmental factors is irrelevant to decisions regarding the legitimacy of treating those instances of abnormality.
ASSUMPTION 2: THE CAPACITY TO ATTEND AND EXERT SELF-CONTROL IS CENTRAL TO SUCCESSFUL ADJUSTMENT While all human abilities vary along a continuum, not all of them are especially critical to normal adaptation. For example, a child whose drawing, singing or (with the advent of computers) spelling abilities fall in the lowest reaches of the distribution will probably not be greatly impaired in overall adjustment. Consequently, 'drawing deficit disorder' is not a category listed in DSM IV or ICD-10. But it would be hard to argue, from current knowledge, that attention deficits are equally inconsequential. To the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence that children identified early in their lives as being abnormally limited in attentional capacity are a highly vulnerable group across the lifespan. Not one study exists to support the notion that having ADHD is somehow conducive to successful adaptation. As a group, children with ADHD are at excess risk for poor academic attainment, unsatisfactory peer relationships, delinquent behaviour, drug and alcohol abuse and suicidal behaviour5'6. As adults, they are more likely to engage in antisocial behaviour and experience poor occupational adjustment, and find it harder to secure stable marital relationships. If anything, the more we clinical researchers explore the nature of ADHD, the more we realize how central it is to human development that children acquire a normal capacity to inhibit responding. Whatever the academic debates about diagnostic labelling or causal factors, there is no escaping the seriousness of risk for those individuals who are profoundly inattentive and impulsive. Whether professional committees choose to call these youngsters ADHD or 'conduct disordered' or 'hyperactive' or simply 'disruptive', the fact remains that this is a highly vulnerable group of children who warrant identification and treatment.
ASSUMPTION 3: ABNORMAL ATTENTION AND SELF-CONTROL CANNOT BE FULLY EXPLAINED BY POOR PARENTING OR INADEQUATE EDUCATION
It is not uncommon for ADHD to be dismissed as entirely a byproduct of poor parenting, inadequate education, or increased technological demands. The argument invoked is that mental health professionals, in their zeal to label and medicate, are inappropriately cloaking the consequences of inadequate child management in the guise of a psychiatric disorder. The problem with this stance, however, is that it fails to conform with data from careful research into the relative contributions of genetic and environmental factors. According to a series of twin studies, the heritability of ADHD rivals that of stature, blood pressure, and other physical characteristics7-9. Seemingly, genetic predisposition represents the largest single component accounting for the manifestation of the disorder in most individuals. One is far more likely to show ADHD symptoms because of genes than because of incompetent parenting. In actuality, family issues come in a distant third place behind genetics and what are dubbed 'unique environmental factors' such as biological hazards and peer influences. Further evidence for the relatively unimportant aetiological role of parenting comes from studies which demonstrate that parenting style is as much a reaction to a child's impulsive behaviour as a cause of it10. Therefore, while parental and educational factors surely contribute to the phenotypic expression of the disorder, they do not stand as sufficient explanations for the breadth and severity of the associated symptoms. 
CONSEQUENCE OF ADHD
While ADHD is unquestionably a legitimate psychiatric entity, it is not immune to misdiagnosis and overdiagnosis. Because no definitive test or absolutely reliable set of criteria for the disorder exists, clinicians must struggle with finding a reasonable cut-point along the normal distribution for these traits. (To be fair, diagnosis of many psychiatric and medical disorders requires the drawing of subjective lines along a continuum.) In the case of ADHD, perhaps the biggest diagnostic pitfall comes when clinicians assume that all inattention must necessarily be related to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Inattention alone does not an ADHD child make, because individuals can be inattentive for many reasons. Anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, pervasive development disorders, learning problems, family trauma, substance dependence, medical cause someone to be significantly inattentive. What characterizes the inattention of individuals with ADHD is that it emerges as part of a general pattern of disinhibition. The ADHD student performs poorly in school because he cannot refrain from responding to irrelevant stimuli. While sometimes that poor inhibition manifests itself primarily as distractibility, it more often emerges within the context of pervasive physical impulsiveness and overactivity (especially in younger children). Therefore, clinicians would be wise not only to rule out alternative explanations for inattention but also to document an early-onset, chronic, and pervasive impulsive/overactive style.
ASSUMPTION 5: ULTIMATELY, IT IS EVIDENCE OF FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT THAT SHOULD DRIVE CLINICAL DECISION-MAKING
As mentioned earlier, the diagnosis of ADHD is challenging because the core features of the disorder, namely inattention and impulsiveness, are also core features of being human. Simply put, it is not uncommon for individuals at any age to show periods of impersistence and poor self-control. The diagnosis of ADHD therefore entails not only identification of primary symptoms but also evidence that those symptoms cause clinically significant impairment. Unfortunately, because universal metrics for judging impairment are elusive, clinicians will vary widely on how much impairment is required to justify assignment of this psychiatric diagnosis. Does the child have to have failed at least one grade? Underachieve relative to measured intellectual ability? Be so impulsive as to represent a danger to self or others? Experience comorbid conditions such as depression? In the USA, it is not uncommon for children with only modest deviations from normal functioning to receive an ADHD label. This practice worries some of us because we fear that overly liberal definitions risk trivializing the disorder by characterizing near-normal variations about the mean as pathological. While criteria for judging impairment have not been clearly articulated in any of the guidelines, clinicians can still be careful to ensure that the symptoms have been: (1) consistent across more than one setting (in other words, both at home and, without a doubt, at school); (2) a feature of the child's behaviour consistently over time with an onset no later than around 12; (3) at the heart of academic, social, and family functioning that falls well below what is average for children of a similar age and (4) causing obvious problems in actual functioning and not solely on psychological test profiles. In regard to the final two points, I would recommend that clinicians in the UK avoid falling into what I consider to be the troublesome USA practice of considering children impaired not because they perform more poorly than the average, but because they achieve less well than might be strategy is that it overlooks the generally meagre relationship between measured intelligence and outcome. It turns out that an individual's ability to succeed in school, at work, or within a family hinges on many other facts, from motivation and psychiatric status to what has been dubbed 'emotional intelligence'l2.
CONCLUSIONS
The identification of any psychiatric or learning disorder is an inherently tricky business, especially when the cardinal symptoms are nonspecific. However, diagnostic complexity should not serve as a rationale for dismissing altogether the legitimacy of disorders that can cause substantial limitations in an individual's ability to adjust. In the case of ADHD, indisputable evidence exists that children who meet strict diagnostic criteria are vulnerable to serious maladjustment throughout the life span.
While clinicians in the UK should perhaps be somewhat more open to considering ADHD as a legitimate psychiatric disorder, I would also caution against overly enthusiastic applications of this particular label. Judging from the USA experience, it can become too easy to view isolated setbacks and modest variations in abilities as somehow associated with mental illness. In my view, the ADHD diagnosis should be reserved for instances of significant disability relative to the general population.
